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294 SMITE: v' BULL [50 C.2d 
A. No. 24510. In Bank. May 16, 1958.] 
BERTILLE B. SMITH, as Administratrix With Will An-
nexed, etc., Respondent, v. FRANK BULL, Appellant. 
[1] Partnership-Dissolution-Proof.-Evidence that on February 
5 of a certain year defendant wrote plaintiff's husband, with 
whom he was associated in an advertising agency partnership, 
that he was dissatisfied with the partnership and believed it 
should be "liquidated," that on February 20 defendant signed 
a lease on new premises and certified that he was conducting 
an advertising agency at the new premises under a new name, 
that on the same day he was notified by a finance company 
having a major account in the partnership that its account 
would be transferred to him, that on February 23 defendant 
notified plaintiff's husband of the lease he had taken, that on 
February 26 the finance company notified plaintiff's husband 
that it would no longer require his "personal services" and 
that because of the dissolution of the partnership it would no 
longer place its account there, that on February 27 defendant 
and plaintiff's husband signed and filed notices of dissolution 
of the partnership, and that on February 28 defendant moved 
from the partnership offices to the new location, taking with 
him the firm accounts, books and all of the partnership em-
ployees except one, sustained a finding that the partnership 
continued until February 27, inasmuch as defendant continued 
on in the agency's office until that time. 
[2] !d.-Actions-Torts by Partners-Evidence.-Evidence that in 
January of a certain year a finance company holding the major 
account in an advertising agency partnership in which defend-
ant and plainti.ff's husband were associated was notified of 
the impending dissolution of the partnership while plaintiff's 
husband did not hear about it until defendant's letter to him 
on February 5, that defendant and an employee of the agency 
knew early in February that defendant would have the finance 
company's account, that on February 20 defendant, on being 
officially notified that he was to have this account, signed a 
lease for new offices and a certificate to do business under a 
new name though the partnership was not formally dissolved 
until February 27, that he did not leave the partnership offices 
until February 28 when he took the firm accounts, books and 
all of the partnership employees except one, and that plaintiff's 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Partnership, § 80; [2] Partnership, 
§ 67(3); [3-5] Goodwill, § 2; [6] Goodwill, § 5; [7] Partnership, 
§ 92; [8] Appeal and Error, § 1233; [9] Partnership, § 89; [10] 
Partnership, § 68(2); [11] Appeal and Error, § 1268. 
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husband was not notified of the finance company's decision 
to dispense with his services until February 28, sustained a 
finding that defendant appropriated and converted for his own 
benetlt and profit the partnership business, goodwill, custo-
mers and employees. 
[3] Goodwill-Who May Acquire or Possess.-A personal service 
organization, such as an advertising ageney partnership, may 
have goodwill where it h11s enjoyed a fine reputation and has 
been prolitable to all eoncerned. 
[4] Id.-Nature.-Although the goodwill of a business may be 
the result of the personal skill, talent, experience or reputation 
of an individual connected with the business, it may attach to 
and continue with the business after the separation of the 
individual on whom it was founded. 
[5] Id.-Nature.-The customers of a business are an essential 
part of its goodwill, and without their continued custom good-
will ceases to exist, since goodwill is the expectation of con-
tinued public patronage. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 14100.) 
[6] !d.-Construction of Contract of Sale.-When the goodwill of 
a business is sold, it is not the patronage of the general public 
which is sold, but that patronage whieh has become an asset 
of that business. 
[7] Partnership-Liquidation-Accountability of Survivor to Es-
tate of Deceased Partner.-Defendant partner was properly 
held liable to the estate of a deceased partner for appropri-
ation of the goodwill of an advertising agency partnership 
whose major client was a finance company, where the goodwill, 
if the agency had been sold to a third person, would, because 
of the finance company's aceount, have been a valuable asset 
of the partnership, where defendant's receipt of such account 
was not a eontract subsequently made with a former client 
after dissolution of the partnership but the account was 
received for his own benefit and profit during continuance of 
the partnership because of the satisfactory service theretofore 
rendered by him, the deceased partner and an employee, and 
where the inference was clear that both defendant 11nd the 
employee worked toward that result without the deceased 
partner's knowledge or consent and that any dissatisfaction 
the finance company nwy have had with the way its account 
was handled was concealed from the deceased partner. 
[8] Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Authority of Court.-
The weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses are matters 
for the trier of fact, not for a reviewing court. 
[9] Partnership- Liquidation-Assets-GoodwilL-A determina-
tion of the trial court that the goodwill of an advertising 
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agency partnership had a value of $57,391.66 at the time of 
dissolution and that plaintiff, whose deceased husband was 
associated with defendant as a partner in such firm, was en-
titled to one half thereof was sustained by the testimony of 
plaintiff's expert witness,. a certified public accountant, who 
testified fully as to the methods used by him in computing the 
value of the goodwill and that it was not customary to carry 
a goodwill item on the books of a firm unless it had been 
purchased by that firm, and whose testimony was not contro-
verted. 
[10] !d.-Actions-Questions of Law and Fact.-Whether defend-
ant partner was guilty of appropriation of firm assets, includ-
ing goodwill, and whether the business possessed a goodwill, 
were questions of fact where the evidence was conflicting. 
[11] Appeal- Questions of Law and Fact- Conclusiveness of 
Findings.-When there is substantial evidence or any infer-
ence to be drawn from evidence to support findings of the 
trial court, an appellate court will not make determinations of 
factual issues contrary to those made by the trier of fact. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Vernon W. Hunt, Judge pro tern.* Affirmed. 
Action by representative of estate of deceased partner 
against surviving partner for an accounting. Judgment for 
plaintiff affirmed. 
A. G. Ritter and H. E. Lindersmith for Appellant. 
Darling, Shattuck & Edmonds, Douglas L. Edmonds and 
Thomas F. Call for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-Defendant Frank Bull appeals from a judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff, Bertille B. Smith, administra-
trix with will annexed of the estate of her husband, Vincent 
Richard Smith, deceased. Mel Roach was also a defendant but 
judgment was in his favor. 
The complaint originally pleaded 10 causes of action but on 
plaintiff's motion in open court, all causes of action, save the 
first were dismissed. The complaint alleged the existence 
of a partnership between Frank Bull and decedent, Vincent 
Richard Smith, and, in brief, an appropriation and conversion 
of the partnership assets, including goodwill, by defendant 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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Bull. The court's findings, conclusions of law and judgment 
were based upon the first cause of action. The judgment 
adjudicated that plaintiff was entitled to one-half of the 
proceeds of four accounts, to a certain sum of money on 
deposit with the Citizens National Trust and Savings Bank 
of Los Angeles, and ''that plaintiff shall recover from defend-
ant Frank Bull the sum of Twenty-eight Thousand Six Hun-
dred Ninety-five and 83/100 Dollars with interest thereon 
from the date of entry of this final judgment until paid at 
the rate of 7% per annum" which sum represented one-half 
of the estimated value of the goodwill of the advertising 
agency known as Smith and Bull. It is from the quoted 
portion of the judgment that defendant Bull appeals. 
The record shows that Vincent Richard Smith and Frank 
Bull had been associated together in the advertising business 
for many years. Their association began in 1936 and contin-
ued thereafter in different forms. At one time the association 
included others and operated as a corporation. On Septem-
ber 1, 1949, an oral partnership agreement was entered into 
between them for the purpose of conducting an advertising 
agency. While the agency, known as Smith and Bull, repre-
sented several accounts, the only major account was that of 
Seaboard Finance Company and the agency was, in effect, a 
''one-account'' agency. The Smith and Bull agency employed 
some 21 or 22 employees and ran its own print shop in con-
junction with the advertising business. Mel Roach, a defend-
ant, was an employee of the agency and acted as general 
manager and senior account executive. His duties with the 
partnership centered around the Seaboard Finance account 
and he spent part of each day, while he was in town, at the 
Seaboard offices where he became very well acquainted with 
the executives of that company. Roach had been associated 
with Smith and Bull for almost the entire length of their 
association although his employment had not been continuous 
prior to the formation of the last partnership because of serv-
ice with the armed forces and because he had been in business 
for himself at one time. 
Smith was ill during the latter part of 1952 and was not as 
active in the partnership as he had previously been and was 
away from the office part of the time. The record shows 
that during this time Bull and Roach gradually took over 
the handling of the Seaboard account which Smith had pre-
viously brought into the office and had controlled. While 
Roach was the one who met with the Seaboard officials, the 
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and the one to whom he reported and from 
whom he took orders was Smith. During the latter part of 
the year 1952, however, the relationship apparently changed 
and Roach conferred 1.vith Bull with respect to the account. 
Although it appears that in December, 1952, Seaboard officials 
had expressed dissatisfaction with the handling of its account, 
that matter was not brought to Smith's attention. On J anu-
ary 15, 1953, a letter was written by Mr. Lide, the assistant 
vice president of Seaboard, referring to a ''conversation be-
tween Frank Bull, Mel Roach and myself the early part of 
December" in which the topic of conversation had been that 
Seaboard was not "too happy" with the service rendered to 
it by Smith and Bull and calling to the partners' attention 
the fact that notice had been served "early in December that, 
unless things improved, it might be necessary to make a change 
in agencies March 1st. However, inasmuch as I will be out 
of the city for approximately three weeks, I think it only fair 
to extend the time to April 1st." The letter concluded with 
the hope that a change in agencies would not be necessary 
and that the association between Seaboard and Smith and Bull 
would continue for many years. This letter was not called to 
Smith's attention and, apparently only Bull, Roach and Sea-
board knew of it. On February 5, 1953, Bull wrote a letter 
in longhand to Smith informing him that he was dissatisfied 
with Smith's handling of his personal affairs as well as his 
business plans for the future and that he believed the partner-
ship should be "liquidated." This was the first time that 
Smith had learned that Bull was dissatisfied with the partner-
ship relationship and was considering dissolution thereof. 
The record eontains an undated letter from Roach to Smith 
who had learned of the Seaboard letter of January 15th 
through a conversation with Mr. Lide. Although the record 
is not clear, this letter was probably written on, or about, 
February 20, 1953. The letter, which was signed "Mel," is 
as follows: ''Overheard your [Smith's] request for a eopy of 
the letter from Lide regarding Seaboard's ultimatum. 
''She [secretary] has not seen, and knows nothing of the 
letter and Frank [Bull] and I grabbed the letter upon arrival 
to prevent anyone here seeing it. In wrong hands or with 
wrong interpretation, the letter could prove very embarrassing 
and create a new problem in the trade. 
"Yon are very welcome to read it at any time but we don't 
want it moving out of the office or to have copies made. The 
situation is very quiet and I have just about resolved all 
May 1958] SMITH v. BULL 
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weakness and got the complaints quieted. Frank [Bull] called 
upon Thompson and Appleby [executives of Seaboard] and 
discussed the entire situation and everything is alright. .Any 
further discussion or re-opening of the issues can only serve 
to confuse and irritate all concerned there. 
"Lide is in the east on business and vacation and I don't 
want anything to arise in his absence which will cause him 
to get on me again about doing things while he is away. I've 
put Perkel [an employee] on the account with me and we 
have the whole year's campaign for all medias layed out and 
approved and Lide and the rest like his personality and his 
ideas and new approach to old ideas. 
"All's well so don't worry about it any more." 
Roach testified that at some time early in January, 1953, 
he notified Seaboard of the impending dissolution of the part-
nership, and that early in February, 1953, Seaboard informed 
him that its account would be transferred to ''Frank Bull & 
Company." Bull admitted that, early in February, he noti-
fied Seaboard that the partnership of Smith and Bull was 
going to be dissolved. On February 20th, Bull signed a lease 
on new premises located not far from the offices occupied by 
the partnership ; on the same day he certified that he was 
conducting an advertising agency at the new premises under 
the name of "Frank Bull & Company." Bull testified that 
on February 20th he was notified by Seaboard that its account 
would be transferred to him. On February 23d, Bull notified 
Smith of the lease he had taken. On ]'ebruary 26th, Seaboard 
notified Smith that it would no longer require his "personal 
services" and that because of the dissolution of the partner-
ship of Smith and Bull, it would no longer place its account 
there. On February 27th, Smith and Bull signed and filed 
notices of dissolution of the partnership. .At about this time 
Smith's attorney notified Bull's representative that Smith 
would hold Bull accountable for the goodwill of the partner-
ship. On February 28th, Bull moved from the partnership 
offices to the new location taking with him the firm accounts, 
books, and all of the partnership employees except one. On 
March 1st, he commenced conducting an advertising agency 
known as Frank Bull and Company. 
The record shows that Roach had told an employee of 
the partnership that he had the Seaboard account "in the 
palm of his hand; he could take it anywhere he wanted to. 
" Bull admitted that he "probably did" or "might 
have" or "could have" told various people that Smith was 
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"constantly off his rocker," that he was taking so much medi-
cine that his mind was affected, that he was ''erratic and eccen-
tric.'' The record also shows that Bull 's decision to open 
his own agency was dependent upon the Seaboard account. 
A certified public accountant, called and qualified as an 
expert witness for the plaintiff, testified that there was a good-
will factor attached to a personal service partnership such 
as the one under consideration; that it was not customary to 
carry such an item on the books of an organization, firm, or 
partnership, unless the goodwill had been purchased origi-
nally; that by using various known and approved methods of 
computation, he was of the opinion that the goodwill factor 
of the partnership should be valued at $57,391.66. This testi-
mony was uncontradicted and defendants produced no expert 
witness to testify concerning the value of the goodwill. The 
record shows that after the dissolution Smith had no accounts 
and no business; that he was in the process of trying to 
organize a new agency at the time of his sudden death on 
June 6, 1953. 
The trial court found, in accord with the allegations of 
plaintiff's complaint, that ''during its existence, the co-
partnership assets consisted of accounts receivable, bank 
accounts, personal and real property and goodwill. In Febru-
ary, 1953, defendant Frank Bull converted and appropriated 
for himself alone, and for his sole benefit and profit, the 
co-partnership business, goodwill, the customers and all the 
company employees, with one exception. At the time of said 
conversion and appropriation the partnership had a goodwill 
of fifty seven thousand three hundred ninety-one and 66/100 
dollars ($57,391.66)." And the court concluded that the 
plaintiff wa:s entitled to "a judgment against defendant 
Frank Bull in the sum of twenty-eight thousand six hundred 
ninety-five and 83/100 dollars ($28,695.83), with interest 
thereon from the date of entry of the final judgment herein, 
until paid, at the rate of seven per cent (7%) per annum. 
This sum represents one-half (lh) of the value of the good 
will of the co-partnership of Smith & Bull when converted 
and appropriated by defendant Frank Bull.'' The trial court 
found the date of dissolution of the partnership to be Febru-
ary 27, 1953. 
Defendant's contentions, although inartistically phrased, 
appear to be that there is no evidence to support the trial 
court's findings that he had converted and appropriated the 
partnership's customers and that there was a valuable good-
May 1958] SMITH v. BuLL 
rso c.2ct 294; 325 P.2d 4631 
will attached to the business. It is also argued that the 
question of the existence of goodwill is one of law, rather 
than fact, and that there is no goodwill attached to a personal 
service business. Defendant argues that he had the right to 
accept new business from Seaboard after the dissolution of 
the partnership without obligation to his "former" partner 
and without being "penalized in damages" therefor. This 
latter argument apparently stems from defendant's theory 
that a dissolution of the partnership took place when he 
notified Smith that he intended to "liquidate" the firm. 
[1] Section 15029 of the Corporations Code provides that 
"The dissolution of a partnership is the change in the relation 
of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated 
in the carrying on as distinguished from the winding up of 
the business." It is obvious from the evidence heretofore set 
forth that the record amply supports the trial court's determi-
nation that the partnership continued until February 27, 
1953, when the notice of dissolution was signed inasmuch as 
Bull continued on in the agency's offices until that time. The 
record does not show that there was any change in the business 
relationship between the two, or in the operation of the 
agency's business, prior to that time. 
[2] There is also ample support for the trial court's find-
ing that during February, 1953, Bull appropriated and con-
verted for his own benefit and profit the partnership business, 
goodwill, customers and employees. The employees occupied 
the same positions with Frank Bull and Company, at the 
same salaries, as they had with Smith and Bull. It will be 
recalled that Bull took with him all the partnership accounts 
and that the major account, Seaboard, was notified early in 
January of the impending dissolution of the partnership 
while Smith did not hear about the probable dissolution until 
Bull's letter to him on February 5th; that Bull and Roach 
knew early in :F'ebruary that Bull would have the Seaboard 
account; that Bull could not or would not have opened his 
own offices without the Seaboard account. On the same day 
(February 20th) that Bull was officially notified that he was 
to have the Seaboard account, he signed a lease for new offices 
and a certificate to do business under the name "Frank Bull 
& Company" although the partnership was not formally dis-
solved until February 27th and he did not leave the Smith 
and Bull offices until February 28th. Smith was not notified 
of Seaboard's decision to dispense with his services until 
February 26th. 
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Defendant's argument that he is being penalized in dam-
ages and prohibited from Seaboard employment, 
after dissolution, is devoid of merit. The judgment hereto-
fore set forth did not purport to award plaintiff damages 
because of the appropriation of the Seaboard account, or any 
of the profit made by Bull from that account, but was 
concerned, so far as is here pertinent, with the appropriation 
and value of the goodwill of the business. 
[3] There is no merit to defendant's contention that a 
personal service organization has no goodwill. The record 
shows that Smith and Bull had, during their long association, 
enjoyed a fine reputation in the advertising field and that the 
association had been profitable to all concerned. [4] Al-
though the goodwill of a business may be the result of the 
personal skill, talent, experience, or reputation of an individ-
ual connected with the business, it may attach to and continue 
with the business even after the separation of the individual 
on whom it was founded (24 Cal.Jur.2d 142; Mackay v. Clark 
Rig Bldg. Co., 5 Cal.App.2d 44 [42 P.2d 341] ). In Crutchett 
v. Lawton, 139 Cal.App. 411 [33 P.2d 839}, it was held that a 
contract for the sale of a medical business and the goodwill 
thereof was valid. In Driskill v. Thompson, 141 Cal.App.2d 
479, 484 [296 P.2d 834] (a business involving the operation 
of a dance hall), the court held: "Appellant next argues that 
a partnership dissolvable at will can have no goodwill, be-
cause, so it is urged, such can exist only in a going business . 
. . . The continuance of that business created a goodwill re-
gardless of who continued to operate it. A business, together 
with its goodwill, may continue regardless of the form of 
organization used to conduct it. Appellant continued to 
operate that business and to capitalize on the goodwill of 
that business as a going concern. This was an asset of the 
partnership which he was using for his own benefit.'' In 
Miller v. Hall, 65 Cal.App.2d 200, 205 [150 P.2d 287], where 
the partnership had operated a brokerage business, the court 
held: "From all of these cases, and many others, it appears 
to be well recognized that the goodwill of a business may have 
a considerable value, that while this value may be seriously 
affected by the competition of a retiring partner the question 
of such value is one to be determined in the light of all the 
facts of a particular case, and that where such value exists 
and is appropriated by one of the former partners for his 
own use and benefit he may be required to account to the 
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other partner for his interest in any such value as may appear 
under the circumstances. 
''In the instant case, beyond question, the good will of this 
business would have had a considerable value had the business 
been sold to a third party.'' 
Section 14100 of the Business and Professions Code defines 
"The 'good will' of a business [as] the of con-
tinued public patronage.'' The record here shows that the 
Smith & Bull agency was in effect a ''one account'' agency; 
that the "one account" of value was the Seaboard Finance 
Company (and its predecessor) and that this account had been 
serviced satisfactorily by Smith and Bull during the existence 
of the partnership and for many years prior thereto. It will 
also be recalled that prior to opening his own agency Bull 
waited until he was sure that he would have the Seaboard 
account. [5] As the court stated in Bergum v. Weber, 136 
Cal.App.2d 389, 392 [288 P.2d 623], "The customers of a 
business are an essential part of its goodwill. In fact, with-
out their continued custom goodwill ceases to exist, for 
goodwill is the expectation of continued public patronage. 
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 14100.) 
[6] ''When the goodwill of a business is sold, it is not 
the patronage of the general public which is sold, but that 
patronage which has become an asset of that business." 
In the case under consideration, Bull continued to conduct 
an advertising agency under his own name in the same locality 
as that in which th'3 partnership of Smith and Bull had oper-
ated and with the same personnel servicing the same accounts. 
The trial court after hearing the evidence summarized Bull's 
conduct as follows : '' \Vhy certainly he took everything that 
amounted to anything in the way of business. All that was 
left was the physical assets, which didn't amount to much, 
but he took this big Seaboard account, which was the business 
-it was the biggest portion of the business-and he took that 
and he didn't ask him. He just simply took it, that's all." 
Defendant's reliance upon the case of Heywood v. Sooy, 
45 Cal.App.2d 423, 426, 427 [114 P.2d 361], is misplaced. It 
was there said, in commenting upon the case of Little v. Cald-
well, 101 Cal. 553 [36 P. 107, 40 Am.St.Rep. 89], that "the 
cited case repudiates the notion that a partner is accountable 
after dissolution for any allowance for what may be termed 
the 'good will' of the partnership which may result in con-
tracts of employment after dissolution. While the cited case 
did not involve the precise points presented here, we believe 
304 SMITH v. BULL [50 C.2d 
that it clearly indicates the line of demarcation between 'un-
finished business,' being business covered by contracts of 
employment at the time of dissolution, and other matters, not 
covered by contracts of employment, but which thereafter 
become the subjects of contracts of employment through the 
goodwill previously existing between the partnership and the 
clients. As to the 'unfinished business,' a duty to perform 
services rests on the partnership at the time of dissolution 
and continues thereafter to rest· on the partners or the sur-
viving partner. As to other matters, no duty to perform 
services rests on the partnership at the time of dissolution 
and no duty continues thereafter to rest on the partners or 
surviving partner. And where no duty to perform the serv-
ices rests on the partnership at the time of dissolution, such 
services as may thereafter be performed by either of the 
former partners under contracts of employment S1tbsequently 
made with former clients cannot be considered 'unfinished 
business' of the partnership at the time of dissolution." (Em-
phasis added.) [7] The goodwill with which we are here 
concerned does not involve the profits made from Seaboard 
employment subsequent to dissolution and does not concern 
profits made from that employment subsequent to dissolution 
or so far as goodwill is concerned any unfinished business 
of Smith and Bull. We are concerned with the goodwill 
of what had been a going concern whose major client was 
Seaboard and the fact that had the Smith and Bull agency 
been sold to a third person that goodwill, because of the 
Seaboard account, would have been considered a valuable asset 
of the partnership. In Little v. Caldwell, 101 Cal. 553 [36 
P. 107, 40 Am.St.Rep. 89], the court was concerned with an 
action brought by the widow of a deceased partner of a law 
firm. It was there held that the surviving partner must 
account to the estate of his deceased partner for proceeds 
obtained from contracts made by the firm prior to the death 
of the partner. In other words, the court was there concerned 
with "unfinished business" of the partnership entered into 
prior to the dissolution of the partnership. In the case at bar 
it is obvious from a reading of the record that Bull received 
the Seaboard account for himself because of the satisfactory 
service theretofore rendered Seaboard by Smith, Roach and 
himself. Bull's receipt of the Seaboard account was not a 
contract "subsequently" made with a former client after dis-
solution of the partnership. He received the account for his 
own benefit and profit during the continuance of the partner-
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ship and the inference is clear that both Bull and Roach 
worked toward that result without Smith's knowledge or con-
sent. The inference is also very clear that any dissatisfaction 
Seaboard may have had with the way in which its account 
was handled was concealed from Smith who was informed 
by Roach, probably around Pebruary 20th, in an undated 
letter, that he had ''just about resolved all weakness and got 
the complaints quieted" and. that "everything is alright," 
that the "whole year's campaign for all medias [was] layed 
out and approved" and that "All's well so don't worry 
about it any more.'' In the same letter Smith was warned 
against ''Any further discussion or re-opening of the issues'' 
since to do so would "only serve to confuse and irritate all 
concerned'' at Seaboard. 
As the trial court remarked: "It is just because people who 
have become acquainted with the firm keep on going there 
and doing business there. Of course, here there is the added 
factor that Mr. Bull remained, and more important than that, 
that Mr. Roach remained. He was the guiding figure in this 
whole thing. In spite of his peculiar actions, some of which 
I don't believe, he was still the one that kept this account 
[Seaboard] for Mr. Bull and steered it over to him. I have 
no doubt about that." The court also commented that the 
name of Smith and Bull was not abandoned completely. "It 
became Bull. But here was the same man ; there was never 
any change whatsoever in faces. Here was the same face, but 
the one they were dealing with was this Mr. Roach. This 
was a one account agency practically, for all practical pur-
poses. They had all their eggs in one basket, and this Mr. 
Roach was the one who was getting into their good graces and 
cementing the account there and holding onto it, and he did 
hold onto it, and he carried it right along with Mr. Bull. 
There was never any change at all. They hadn't seen Smith 
for a long time. They weren't relying on Smith. They were 
relying on this firm, and Bull just simply took the whole thing 
over. He took it lock, stock and barrel. Believe me, that is 
one thing the evidence does show. He just took everything." 
Defendant's argument that at one of the early Pebruary 
meetings Smith announced that he was going to try to get the 
Seaboard account is directed to the wt>ight of the evidence with 
which we are not here concerned. [8] The weight of the 
evidence, and the credibility of the witnesses, are matters for 
the trier of fact. And the quoted excerpts from the remarks 
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of the trial judge clearly show his opinions concerning both 
the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. 
[9] 'I'here is no merit to defendant's contention that the 
trial court erroneously fixed the value of the goodwilL Plain-
tiff's expert witness, a certified public accountant, testified 
fully as to the methods used by him in computing the value 
of the goodwill. He also testified that it was not customary 
to carry a goodwill item on the books of a firm unless it had 
been purchased by that firm. His testimony was not contro-
verted in any way and is sufficient to support the determina-
tion of the trial court that the goodwill of the partnership 
had a value of $57,391.66 at the time of dissolution and that 
plaintiff was entitled to one-half thereof. 
Defendant's other arguments consist of a reiteration of 
testimony and evidence which might be considered favorable 
to him. vVith such evidence we are not here concerned. 
[10] Whether or not defendant was guilty of appropriation 
and conversion of firm assets, including the goodwill thereof, 
was a question of fact; whether the business possessed a good-
will is also a question of fact to be determined upon the 
trial of the action (111ackay v. Clark Rig Bldg. Co., 5 Cal.App. 
2d 44, 60 [ 42 P .2d 341] ) . 'rhe trial court determined the 
issues here involved adversely to defendant. [11] When 
there is substantial evidence or any inference to be drawn 
from the evidence to support the findings of the trial court, an 
appellate court will not make determinations of factual issues 
contrary to those made by the trier of faet. (Estate of Bristol, 
23 Cal.2d 221, 223 [143 P.2d 689]; Estate of Teel, 25 Cal.2d 
520, 527 [154 P.2d ; Ambri.z v. Petrolane Ltd., 49 Cal.2d 
470, 477 [319 P.2d 1] .) 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
McCOMB, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! would modify 
the judgment of the superior court by striking therefrom the 
following: 
"3. That plaintiff shall recover from defendant Frank Bull 
the sum of twenty-eight thousand six hundred ninety-five and 
83/100 dollars ($28,695.83), with interest thereon from the 
date of entry of this final judgment, until paid, at the rate of 
seven per cent (7%) per annum." 
As so modified, I would affirm the judgment for the reasons 
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expressed by Mr. Presiding Justice White in the opinion pre-
pared by him for the District Court of Appeal (Cal.App.), 
318 P.2d 46. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 11, 
1958. 
[L.A. No. 24551. In Bank. May 16, 1958.] 
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[1] Unemployment Insurance-Employees-Caddies. -Provisions 
of the Unemployment Insurance Code do not apply to ser-
vices performed in caddying or carrying a golf player's clubs 
by an individual who is not in the employ of the golf club 
or association, and whose services are paid for solely by a mem-
ber of the club. 
[2] Id.-Employees-Caddies.-In an action by operators of golf 
courses to recover unemployment insurance taxes paid on the 
amounts the caddies had received from the players, though the 
evidence disclosed that there was some control over the caddies 
by either the caddie master at one golf club or the starter at 
the other while the caddies were on and around the clubs' 
premises awaiting an opportunity to caddie, where the evi-
dence further showed that after a caddie had been engaged by 
a player the player had exclusive control over the details of 
his work and no one connected with plaintiffs had any control 
over the services rendered by the caddie at any time, the con-
trol exercised by plaintiffs over the caddies fell under the 
principle of law known as "control of the premises" and was 
to be distinguished from the control the golf-playing member 
had over the caddie. 
[3] !d.-Employees-Rules Governing.-If rules are made only 
for the general control of conduct of a person while on the 
premises of another, mere conformity to such rules does not 
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1950 Rev.) Unemployment Relief-
Insurance Act, § 13 et seq. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-6] Unemployment Insurance,§ 10. 
